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Morris: Evidence

EVIDENCE
EDGAR L. MORRIS-:-

There were no significant departures by our Supreme
Court from well established concepts in the field of evidence.
Only sixteen cases worthy of note are discussed here, all
of which merely indicate tendencies of our Court in applying principles which may foreshadow probable applications
in future cases. No legislation adopted by the General Assembly was of importance in the field of Evidence.
Admission
1

Bolen v. Smith held that the act of a property owner, who
had listed property for sale with a real estate broker, in paying
the usual commissions to the broker did not constitute an admission of liability to sell and convey in an action for specific
performance. The Court said that from the fact that the
seller may have been liable to the broker for services rendered, it does not necessarily follow that the same broker had
authority to bind the seller.
Admissibility
2

In State v. Gantt, certain prosecution witnesses had been
permitted to testify, without objection by defendants, as to
bullet wounds on the body of the deceased, and it was held
that raising the question of admissibility comes too late when
urged before the Supreme Court on appeal as a basis for reversal. The indictment charged the appellants with having
used a pistol and a blunt instrument in causing the death,
and it cannot be said that the defendants were not apprised
of the evidence which would be offered by the prosecution.
Vigilantibus non dormientibus leges subveniunt.
The offense of storing and keeping illegal liquor involves
the idea of continuity of habit, and it was held in State v. Center,8 that testimony of former violations, if not too remote in
*B.S. in C.E., 1933, Clemson College; LL.B., 1938, Georgetown University; member South Carolina, District of Columbia, and U. S. Supreme Court Bars; Richland County, South Carolina and American
Bar Association.
1. 223 S.C. 39, 74 S.E. 2d 42 (1953).
2. 223 S.C. 431, 76 S.E. 2d 674 (1953).
3. 223 S.C. 485, 76 S.E. 2d 669 (1953).
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point of time, is admissible against a defendant on trial for
unlawful storing if the testimony tends to establish continuity
of habit, which is a necessary element of the crime of storing.
In Newton v. Batson,4 which involved a suit by a property
owner in a subdivision to restrain the defendant from using
an adjoining lot in any manner inconsistent with its use as a
park or beautified area, the defendant objected to testimony
regarding the representations of real estate agents basing his
objections on the Parol Evidence Rule. The Court said that
while this rule is universally followed, it has no application to
the case at bar, for the reason that the testimony as to the
representations of the real estate agents is simply some evidence of the intentions of the developers of the subdivision.
Testimony, as to representations of real estate agents who
were named on a recorded plat as agents, is competent to show
what was meant by unconventional symbols and markings on
the plat.
State v. Anderson5 involved the admissibility of a written
statement given to investigating officers by the defendant before the enactment of a statute, 6 which provides, generally,
that whenever any officer shall take a written statement in
any investigation, he shall give a copy thereof to the person
making the statement and take his receipt therefor, and that
unless the requirements of the statute have been observed, the
statement shall not be admissible in evidence. In this case,
the written statement involved was given to the officer five
months before the enactment of the statute, and although the
prosecution took place well after the adoption of the statute,
it was held to be admissible even though the defendant did
not receive a copy. The Court reviewed some earlier decisions
in this area:
It is not the function of the court to pass upon the
weight of evidence, but to determine its sufficiency to
support the verdict. State v. Brown, 205 S. C. 514, 32 S. E.
2d 825. If there be any evidence which tends to prove the
fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely
such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to
4. 223 S.C. 545, 77 S.E. 2d 212 (1953).
5. 224 S.C. 419, 79 S.E. 2d 455 (1954).

6. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1952, No. 794, p. 1978, 47 ST.
AT LARGE, p. 1977 (1952). [CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1952,
§§ 1-64, 26-7.1, 26-7.2.]
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it, the case should be submitted to the jury. State v.
Smith, 220 S. C. 224, 67 S. E. 2d 82. The question of
whether such evidence meets the burden of establishing
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt is for
the determination of the jury, as the triers of the facts,
under appropriate instructions by the court. State v.
Roddy, 126 S. C. 499, 120 S. E. 359.
Burden of Proof
Browu 7

Woodle v.
was an action to recover commissions allegedly due under a contract, and it was held that the fact that
an injury might have occurred in any one of several ways did
not preclude recovery if the evidence tends to sustain the reasonable probability that the injury occurred in the way on
which the plaintiff relied. In a civil case, the law does not require proof to a certainty. The Court cited, with approval,
Lancasterv. South CarolinaPower Company,8 wherein it was
said:
The jury has the especial prerogative to decide the
facts, if the evidence tends to sustain the reasonable probability of the manner or way relied upon by the plaintiff
even if the injury might have occurred in one of a dozen
ways. The law does not require proof of a certainty in a
civil suit....
In this case the Court stated that the motion for a non-suit
and directed verdict were properly overruled as it was necessary for the purpose of these motions to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,9 and under
the scintilla rule which prevails in South Carolina, if there
is a scintilla of evidence, which is any material evidence that
if true would tend to establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror, the case should be submitted to the jury for its
determination. 10
The case of Moore v. Evans" was an action for wrongful
death which resulted from a collision occurring when the automobile driven by the decedent and a truck-trailer owned by
the defendant met on a narrow bridge, the Court holding that
7. 223 S.C. 204, 74 S.E. 2d 914 (1953).
8. 181 S.C. 244, 186 S.E. 911 (1936).
9. Citing Cox v. McGraham, 211 S.C. 378, 45 S.E. 2d 595 (1947).
10. Citing among other cases, Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway
Co., 78 S.C. 552, 59 S.E. 641 (1907).
11. 223 S.C. 288, 75 S.E. 2d 598 (1953).
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evidence of the operation of the truck in violation of statutory
provisions against excessive speed and travelling on the wrong
side of the highway warranted submission of the issues to the
jury as to causative negligence and wilfulness, and the resulting actual and punitive damages. The Court in this case differentiated between criminal and civil law applications of circumatantial evidence quoting from Leek v. New South Express

Lines :12
The rule of criminal law that where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, the facts proved must be such as to
preclude every other hypothesis but the guilt of the accused, does not apply in civil cases. In civil actions every
other reasonable conclusion need not be excluded; proof of
circumstances warranting a given inference is sufficient
in such cases. Annotation, 97 Am. St. Rep. 802. The right
to recover on circumstantial evidence for death resulting
from another's negligence depends upon the reasonable
and logical connection such proof establishes between the
death and the negligent act alleged to have caused it. It
is incumbent upon the plaintiff, in the absence of direct
evidence, to show the existence of such circumstances as
would justify the inference that the injury which caused
the death was due to the wrongful act of the defendant,
and not leave the question to mere speculation or conjecture. The facts and circumstances shown should be reckoned with in the light of ordinary experience and such
conclusions deduced therefrom as common sense dictates.
A more recent authority upon the sufficiency of circumstantial3
evidence in civil actions is Hopkins v. Derst Baking Co.,'
wherein the circumstantial evidence which tended to prove liability overcame, in the view of the jury, the conflicting testimony of the truck driver as in this case.
Inference
The ease, Barnwell v. Elliott,14 discusses a problem which
has proved rather troublesome to the Bar,-that is, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and inferences. Our Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
not the law in South Carolina. This case involved serious in12. 192 S.C. 527, 7 S.E. 2d 459 (1940).
13. 221 S.C. 497, 71 S.E. 2d 407 (1952).
14. 80 S.E. 2d 748 (S.C. 1954).
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jury to an unskilled negro worker who was loading lumber
on a truck when a heavy piece of lumber fell from a nearby
stack or pile behind him, striking one of his legs. The defendants entered a general denial to the complaint pleading,
in addition, contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
On the trial of the case, timely motions were made for a nonsuit and a directed verdict. Both motions were refused and
the jury found for the plaintiff, whereupon the Trial Judge
set aside the verdict and entered judgment non obstante verdioto for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to establish negligence. The sole question presented on
appeal was whether there was any testimony reasonably warranting an inference of negligence on the part of the defendants in one or more of the specifications alleged in the complaint. The Court in reversing the trial court cited the language of the Trial Judge in granting the motion non obstacnte
verdicto:
All we have is that the piece fell.
He further stated:
In the instant case to say that the mere fact that the
timber fell is evidence of an unsafe place provided by the
master would be to apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur, to
indulge in surmise and conjecture.
The Supreme Court said that if the question of negligence had
to be determined solely from the testimony of the appellant,
who was unable to state the cause of the timber falling, the
conclusion of the Trial Judge would be correct. 15 But in determining the question of negligence, all of the testimony must
be considered:
We have held in numerous cases that, even though a
nonsuit should have been granted at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's testimony, yet, if the deficiency of evidence
was supplied either on direct or cross examination of the
defendant's witnesses, neither a nonsuit nor a directed
verdict could be granted at the conclusion of all the testimony. Eargle v. Sumter Lighting Co., 110 S. C. 560, 96
S. E. 909, 911.
15. Citing Watson v. Charleston Stevedoring Co., 141 S.C. 355, 139
S.E. 778 (1927); Jackson v. Brock, 160 S.C. 471, 159 S.E. 22 (1930);
Weston v. Hillyer, 160 S.C. 541, 159 S.E. 390 (1930); Culbreth v. Taylor-Colquitt Co., 168 S.C. 153, 167 S.E. 148 (1932).
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The Court went on to say:
It is elementary that negligence may be established by
circumstantial evidence. Thornton v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry. Co., 98 S. C. 348, 82 S. E. 433; Watson v. Coxe Bros.
Lumber Co., 203 S. C. 125, 26 S. E. 2d 401. And in considering the sufficiency of such evidence, 'the facts and
circumstances shown should be reckoned with in the light
of ordinary experience and such conclusions deduced
therefrom as common sense dictates.' Leek v. New South
Lines, 192 S. C. 527, 7 S. E. 2d 459, 462. The fact that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applied in this jurisdiction does not mean that negligence may not be established by circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence. Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S. C. 500, 20
S. E. 2d 153, 141 A. L. R. 1010. It is also important to
bear in mind that the fact that an injury may have been
caused in one of two or more ways does not preclude recovery, 'if the facts and circumstances in evidence warrant a reasonable inference that it was caused in any
way alleged in the complaint for which the master would
be liable.' Steele v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 103 S.
C. 102, 87 S. E. 639, 643. (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Vereen,16 the defendant was convicted of larceny
and privily stealing from the person of the prosecuting witness who had fallen asleep in the defendant's taxicab. The investigating peace officers testified that the defendant told
them that the crime was committed in the county where the
indictment was found, and the Court held under these facts
that it was not necessary in a criminal case for the prosecution
to prove venue affirmatively if there is sufficient evidence
from which venue can be inferred.
In Troy Cemetery Association v. Davis,17 it was held that in
civil actions every other reasonable conclusion need not be
excluded; proof of circumstances warranting a given infer8
ence is sufficient in such cases.'
McLauchlin v. Gressette"9 involved an action for specific
performance of an alleged oral contract to devise realty to a
16. 223 S.C. 34,74 S.E. 2d 223 (1953).
17. 223 S.C. 305, 75 S.E. 2d 458 (1953).

18. Citing with approval, Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E. 2d

330, 15 A.L.R. 2d 163 (1949).
19. 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E. 2d 149 (1953).
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nephew and his wife, if they would live in testatrix' home and
take care of her in her old age. The plaintiff relied upon testimony as to statements made by testatrix during and before the
period of performance, and it was held that this testimony was
competent and not merely self-serving declarations of interested parties within the meaning of Section 26-402,20 in that to
disqualify a witness under the state, the test is that his interest
may be affected by "the direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment."
The case of Thompson v. South Carolina State Highway Department2 l included, among other matters, a consideration of
the testimony of a State Highway Patrol Officer who testified
as to the speed of an automobile which he did not see in motion, and the Court said that under those circumstances the
patrolman was no more qualified to judge the speed of such
a car than the average man sitting on the jury.
Hearsay
Pearson22

State v.
involved the prosecution of the defendant
as a second offender for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. The defendant objected
to the introduction of a report made by a magistrate pursuant
to a statutory requirement of a record of defendant's prior
conviction of the same offense. The Court said that it is generally held that where a public official is required by law to
make a certificate or written statement as to some matter or
fact pertaining to and as a part of his official duty, such writing is competent evidence of the matter or fact therein recited,
and is an accepted exception to the Hearsay Rule.
In State v. Robinson,2 3 the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the State by sale, delivery and giving to
certain individuals, about to take the state teacher's examination, answers to questions contained in the examination. It
was shown that the prosecuting witness had made two inconsistent sworn statements, and the prosecution, in an effort to
corroborate one of the statements, called a third party who
testified as to a conversation that he had with the prosecuting
witness when only the two persons were present. The testi20.
21.
22.
23.

CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1952.

224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E. 2d 160 (1953).
223 S.C. 377, 76 S.E. 2d 151 (1953).
223 S.C. 314, 75 S.E. 2d 465 (1953).
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mony of such a third party was held to be pure hearsay and
therefore not admissible.
Cannon v. Motors Insurance Corporation24 was an action by
a used car dealer in claim and delivery for possession of an
automobile against the insurance company asserting title by
virtue of a bill of sale from the alleged owner to whom the
insurance company had paid the proceeds of an insurance
policy covering loss of the car by theft. It appeared that an
attempt was made to permit the custodian of the manufacturer's records to testify by deposition as to what the records
contained. Objection was made that this testimony was hearsay. It appeared that the records were compiled from manufacturer's production tags sent to the office. At no time were
the records themselves offered in evidence. It was held that
this deposition did not come under any of the exceptions to
the Hearsay Rule, and the testimony deposition was not admissible in that the testimony of the witness was based on
the entries and not the entries themselves.2 5
Judicial Notice
Rhode v. Ray Waits Motors, Inc.26 involved an action to recover damages for the alleged wrongful taking from the plaintiff of an automobile which she claimed to have purchased
from defendant. It appeared that the plaintiff procured
a third person to purchase for her a car from the defendant,
and that the third person gave the defendant a worthless
check. While the case went off on another point, the Court
said, in passing, that it would take judicial notice of the fact
that, as a general rule, the practice of the automobile trade
(as far as new cars are concerned) to refuse to make a sale
to enable someone else to make a resale is a practice very
generally followed.

24. 224 S.C. 368, 79 S.E. 2d 369 (1953).
25. Citing Moore v. Postal Telegraph-Cable, 202 S.C. 225, 24 S.E. 2d
361 (1943); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commissioners, 86
S.C. 91, 67 S.E. 1069 (1910); Coosaw Mining Co. v. Carolina Mining Co.,
75 F. 860 (4th Cir. 1896).
26. 223 S.C. 160, 74 S.E. 2d 823 (1953).
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